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Abstract 9 
 10 
Background 11 
Awareness of the need to address food defence is gaining pace in the food industry. Indeed 12 
implementing an effective food defence strategy is a key pre-requisite to comply with third 13 
party certification standards. There is however a knowledge gap with regard to the types of 14 
threat that fall within the scope of a food defence strategy  and also how these issues can then 15 
be mitigated and where possible eliminated. 16 
 17 
Scope and Approach 18 
This research seeks to position food defence as a supply chain risk mitigation strategy and use 19 
case studies of real-world issues to frame the taxonomy of food defence threats. 20 
 21 
Key findings 22 
In order to differentiate food defence threats (food attack) from wider food crime, the research 23 
postulates that food defence strategies needs to address intentional adulteration to gain personal 24 
attention, to gain financial reward through extortion or to gain attention for a particular cause 25 
or ideology i.e. food terrorism. More covert threats include sabotage, espionage, intellectual 26 
property theft, and cybercrime, including hacktivism. These threats can cause actual harm to 27 
individuals, members of certain populations and communities or to organisations. This can lead 28 
to large scale, economic, political or social unrest and disruption of the supply chain and thus 29 
fit within the scope of food defence activities. To inform food defence risk assessment and 30 
management processes, this taxonomy needs to be developed and accepted across the food 31 
industry so that threats can be consistently and effectively addressed and as a result consumers, 32 
industry partners, shareholders and also the organisation itself can be protected. 33 
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 36 
Highlights:  37 
 Food defence is an under-researched phenomenon. 38 
 Food defence strategies addresses multiple product and supply chain threats 39 
 More supply chain focused guidance should be developed to inform food defence 40 
strategies.    41 
   42 
1. Introduction 43 
The United States (US) Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Section 342 determines 44 
adulterated food principally as food that bears or contains: “any poisonous or deleterious 45 
substance which may render it injurious to health.” The US FDA “Mitigation Strategies to 46 
Protect Food Against Intentional Adulteration: Guidance for Industry” defines a contaminant 47 
as “any biological, chemical, physical, or radiological agent that may be added to food to 48 
intentionally cause illness, injury, or death” (FDA, 2018a). However other sources distinguish 49 
between the use of the terms “adulterant” and “contaminant”, with some stating that 50 
unintentional contamination of food is the focus of established food safety measures (Mitenius, 51 
Kennedy & Busta, 2014), and adulteration is within the area of food fraud. In this context, 52 
adulteration is considered by the food industry as “the addition of an undeclared material into 53 
a food item or raw material for economic gain” (BRC, 2018:108) or for wider fraudulent 54 
purposes (Spink & Moyer, 2011a; Manning & Soon, 2014). GFSI (2017) defines food defense 55 
as “the process to ensure the security of food and drink from all forms of intentional malicious 56 
attack including ideologically motivated attack leading to contamination.” This definition uses 57 
the term contamination rather than adulteration. Other definitions of adulteration include both 58 
intentional substitution and unintentional contamination (Bansal, Singh, Mangal et al. 2017; 59 
Kowalska, Soon & Manning, 2018).  60 
Some suggest that food defence related activities are distinct from food fraud (Spink & 61 
Moyer, 2011b) as they are motivated by the impact they cause i.e. food defence strategies 62 
encompasses the activities or efforts undertaken to protect food from intentional acts of 63 
adulteration (FDA, 2018b). However, other US regulatory sources state food defense “means 64 
the effort to protect food from intentional acts of adulteration where there is an intent to cause 65 
wide scale public health harm.” (FDA, 2018a). This suggests that food defense plans should 66 
only address those threats where the intent is widespread harm and it is the size of impact that 67 
predetermines what should be considered and addressed in a food defence plan. This is at odds 68 
with the Global Food Safety Initiative definition that states it includes all forms of intentional 69 
malicious attack (GFSI, 2014; GFSI, 2017; BRC, 2018), malicious tampering or terrorism 70 
(Spink & Moyer, 2011b), or a malicious and ideologically motivated attack leading to 71 
compromised products and/or supply chain disruption (PAS 96, 2017), panic or fear (Spink, 72 
Moyer, Park, & Heinonen, 2013).   73 
This narrative across the literature suggests intentional adulteration addressed by food 74 
defence strategies is separate from the strategies to address economically motivated 75 
adulteration (EMA). Whilst with EMA the aim of the perpetrators is for intentional adulteration 76 
to continue undiscovered for as long as possible so that the maximum financial benefit can be 77 
derived, food defence threats are different. Food defence threats include activities that are 78 
“impact motivated” whereby an agent that is chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 79 
(CBRN) or physical in nature, is used by perpetrators who seek to maliciously and intentionally 80 
adulterate food where such activities are actively disclosed to organisations and the general 81 
public in order to derive the associated personal, political or social impact. Food defence threats 82 
reflect a motivation to do harm to distinct and targeted victim(s) with notions of personal 83 
benefit to the perpetrator in terms of underpinning an ideological statement, a means to gain 84 
notoriety, revenge, restorative justice or envy, (Hirschl, 1969; Cohen & Felson, 1979; Pease, 85 
2006; Walklate, 2007; Hirschauer & Zwoll, 2008). Some sources consider that the scope of 86 
food defense includes all intentional activities seen as a threat including food fraud, tampering 87 
and food terrorism (Davidson et al. 2016) and wider threats too (PAS 96, 2017).  88 
A threat is “something that can cause loss or harm which arises from the ill-intent of 89 
people” (PAS 96, 2017:3). The distinction between an agent and the threat is again confused 90 
in the literature with some sources defining the material agent itself as a threat. PAS 96 (2017) 91 
differentiates between six types of threats to that need to be addressed under food fraud (EMA, 92 
counterfeiting) and food defence mitigation strategies i.e. malicious contamination, extortion, 93 
espionage, and cyber-crime. The scope of PAS 96 (2017) is wider than that suggested by the 94 
FDA (2018a) in terms of food defence which states that: 95 
“Acts of intentional adulteration may take several forms: acts intended to cause wide scale 96 
public health harm, such as acts of terrorism focused on the food supply; acts of disgruntled 97 
employees, consumers, or competitors; and economically motivated adulteration (EMA)… 98 
Acts of disgruntled employees, consumers, and competitors are generally intended to attack 99 
the reputation of a company, and EMA is intended to obtain economic gain. In the spectrum of 100 
risk associated with intentional adulteration of food, attacks intended to cause wide scale public 101 
health harm to humans are ranked as the highest risk. Therefore, the IA [interntional 102 
adulteration] rule is focused on addressing those acts and not acts of disgruntled employees, 103 
consumers, or competitors, or acts of EMA.” 104 
This shows a clear differentiation between regulatory requirements with regard to the scope 105 
of food defence plans and market compliance approaches that require the use of Threat 106 
Analysis Critical Control Point (TACCP) via the use of the PAS 96 guidelines as a pre-requisite 107 
to supply.  TACCP focuses not only on the threat but also the typology of perpetrators that 108 
need to be considered when developing a food defence strategy including: the extortionist, the 109 
extremist, the irrational individual and here perpetrators suffering with mental health issues 110 
should be considered, the disgruntled individual especially those who have previously worked 111 
for a food business and/or associated supply chain and the hacktivist or cybercriminal.  112 
Therefore, food defense encompasses the active steps taken, the protection activities, and/or 113 
the security assurance process or procedures, often called countermeasures, that deliver product 114 
safety with regard to intentional acts of adulteration to cause harm (Manning & Soon, 2016). 115 
The term food defense describes what needs to be done i.e. procedures, protocols, or processes 116 
to mitigate a given activity or threat rather than focusing on the specific taxonomy of activities 117 
or perpetrators. Increasingly, these procedures and protocols are seen by retailers, 118 
manufacturers and food service as a pre-requisite to supply (Wiśniewska, 2015). However, in 119 
order to be able to implement effective food defense mitigation strategies, a clear understanding 120 
of the potential threats, and associated motivations and rationalisation used by perpetrators and 121 
also the agents they might employ is essential. This level of understanding is further framed by 122 
determining how to develop countermeasures that reduce both the capability of the perpetrators 123 
to take action and also reduce the opportunities for such action to occur.  124 
The aim of this paper is develop the taxonomy of food defence threats in order to postulate 125 
what forms the associated food defense strategies need to take. The methodological approach 126 
employed was to undertake a review of existing literature to then frame the conceptual research. 127 
Screening of both academic and grey literature has demonstrated there is limited previous 128 
research in terms of food defence strategies at the level of the food organisation. This is 129 
especially true of emerging threats defined in PAS 96 such as hacktivism or cybercrime. This 130 
is the research gap that this paper seeks to address.   131 
2. Taxonomy of food defense threats and perpetrators 132 
2.1 Intentional impact orientated adulteration and extortion 133 
At its simplest the taxonomy of food defense threats for impact orientated adulteration 134 
rather than EMA can be described in terms of adulteration through the use of hazardous agents 135 
i.e. biological agents, chemical agents, physical agents and radiological agents (Dalziel, 2009; 136 
Fredrickson, 2014). The diversity of these agents is complex driven primarily by ease of access 137 
e.g. the decision to use glass which is readily available versus radionuclear material which is 138 
not, and secondly, the means and opportunity for contamination e.g. on farm, within 139 
manufacturing and processing, food service, retail or the home (Meulenbelt, 2018).  Table 1 140 
synthesizes data on confirmed incidents in the literature, examples of agents used by location 141 
in the supply chain and their impact. The data shows that confirmed incidents are 142 
predominantly at the tertiary stages of the supply chain and also in the home some of which 143 
are cases of domestic poisoning which do not fit within a reflection on food defense strategies 144 
employed at organisational level. The majority of the confirmed cases take place pre-harvest 145 
(n=365), then in the home (n=265) and then at retail and food service (n=89). Agents used at 146 
farm level have included glyphosate, plant toxin, cyanide, and rodenticide, with a much wider 147 
range of agents at food service and retail level. 148 
Take in Table 1 149 
 150 
These incidents are linked to the extortionist, the extremist, the irrational or disgruntled 151 
individual i.e. perpetrators either internal or external to the organisation who have opportunity 152 
to commit this offense. Extortion can be described as the actions undertaken to obtain 153 
something which the perpetrator values (e.g. money, assets, influence or impact) from a person 154 
or organisation by force, intimidation, threat or illegal activity. Information on extortion cases 155 
in the food supply chain rarely appear in the public domain, but one incident with Heinz Baby 156 
Food in the United Kingdom (UK) was the catalyst in the 1990s for tamper evident packaging 157 
and improved product security within the distribution chain and on retail shelves. 158 
Case study 1: Heinz Baby Food 1988 159 
In 1989 Heinz had to withdraw from sale batches of baby food in the UK worth an 160 
estimated £30 million pounds when Rodney Whitchelo, a former Scotland Yard detective who 161 
was later sentenced to seventeen years in prison, attempted to extort millions of pounds from 162 
the food giant by spiking the food with bleach and razor blades (The Independent, 1999). Fisher 163 
(1989) highlights how after the initial publicity about contamination of food, copy-cat cases 164 
occurred causing concern and fear to escalate with 220 reported incidents of baby food 165 
contamination in April 1989. However police first began their investigations in August 1988 166 
when £20,000 was demanded by the extortionist and paid into a bank account and then 167 
subsequently removed from various cash points (ATMs). After the initial payments stopped 168 
the extortionist demanded £1 million from Heinz contaminating two cans of baby food after 169 
the demand. The perpetrator was eventually charged, tried and imprisoned. This case study 170 
shows the challenges of the renegade insider who commits a crime whilst being aware of the 171 
protocols and checks and balances in place within criminal investigations i.e. they can 172 
circumvent the food defence systems that have been designed and implemented . This case is 173 
not alone. 174 
In a case in 2016 in the UK an extortionist who demanded £2 million not to contaminate 175 
food with cyanide was traced through his DNA on the stamp on the letter and was jailed for 176 
seven years. The vial sent with the letter contained five to ten lethal doses of cyanide (Smith, 177 
2016). In September 2017, a German man was charged with threatening to put poisoned baby 178 
food throughout Europe with a demand to multiple supermarkets for nearly £8.8 million (Licea, 179 
2017: Rojas, 2017). The man’s DNA was found on five jars that were recovered from stores 180 
and then found to contain ethylene glycol. Psychological issues were cited as a mitigating issue 181 
with the perpetrator, but this was rejected in court and he was found guilty of attempted murder 182 
and extortion and sentenced to twelve and a half years in prison (BBC, 2018). 183 
Case Study 2: Fonterra, New Zealand (NZ) 184 
In November 2014, Fonterra was the victim of anonymous threats to contaminate 185 
commercial milk supplies with sodium fluroacetate or 1080, a pesticide, unless its usage was 186 
halted on farm (Manhire, 2015).  Highly concentrated levels of 1080 were mixed with infant 187 
formula and posted to Fonterra and Federated Farmers with a letter stating contaminated infant 188 
milk powder would enter the Chinese and other markets (NZHerald, 2016). Whilst 189 
ecoterrorism was cited by some as a possible motive that led to the £18 million costs of the 190 
incident, a NZ businessman, Jeremy Kerr was subsequently jailed for eight and a half years 191 
after pleading guilty to two charges of attempted blackmail and the judge ruled that as he owned 192 
a company that made an alternative pesticide to 1080 this had motivated his activities because 193 
of the potential economic gain (BBC, 2016).  The extortion threat required the dairy 194 
organisation, Fonterra, to take action to develop a robust methodology for detection of 1080 in 195 
milk and powdered milk products (Cooney, Varelis & Bendall, 2016). Cooney et al.  (2016) 196 
state that having developed and validated the methodology between January and July 2015, 197 
136,000 fluid milk samples were tested as part of a multi-agency food defense strategy to 198 
maintain confidence in the safety of NZ milk and dairy products. This case study highlights 199 
the challenge of addressing a food defense incident early on in the investigation, especially 200 
where no existing tests exist to check for the presence of the reported agent in the supply chain, 201 
the crucial role of intelligence and the need for police forces to work closely with food 202 
businesses. The risk of food terrorism was hinted at in this case study, but food terrorism is a 203 
real threat and is now considered. 204 
2.2. Food terrorism 205 
Terrorism is defined in Title 22 Chapter 38 of US. Code 2656f as "premeditated, 206 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant [civilian] targets by 207 
subnational groups or clandestine agents.” The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2014) 208 
define terrorism as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals 209 
or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, 210 
religious or ideological objectives.” Terrorist activities, usually but not always undertaken by 211 
non-nation actors, are designed to engender fear, terror, panic and anxiety in the population 212 
and as a result reduce the level of confidence in the government, leading to uncertainty and 213 
political instability (Alvarez et al. 2010: Fredrickson, 2014) or the attainment of a specific 214 
political goal (Nestle, 2003). Food terrorism is defined as “the deliberate (or threat of) 215 
contamination of food with hazardous agents (biological, chemical, physical, or radionuclear) 216 
for the purpose of causing injury or death and/or disrupting social, economic, or political 217 
stability” (Fredrickson, 2014:311). Thus food terrorism, if it occurs, could cause severe health 218 
implications to the population and economic and trade disruption either through direct costs 219 
due to the culling of livestock, disposal of food products and the potential compensation paid 220 
to farmers and producers and the impact on public health services including the cost of 221 
hospitalisation (Manning et al. 2005). Further, food terrorism can lead to consequential loss to 222 
the local or national economy, loss of consumer confidence in the food supply chain and loss 223 
of political confidence and support following a major food product recall or the mass culling 224 
of livestock (Manning et al. 2005). An example of the impact on public health services of a 225 
terrorism incident is the 1995 nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system that caused 12 226 
deaths and required 5000 people to seek medical attention involving 131 ambulances, 1364 227 
emergency technicians and over 4000 people needing to get to medical care themselves (WHO, 228 
2002). A similar incident associated with food could have equal impact. In 2011, there was an 229 
Escherichia coli O104:H4 outbreak in Germany associated with sprouts from fenugreek seeds 230 
which was not explicitly connected to a food defence threat, but its impact demonstrates how 231 
a similar food defense issue could cause significant challenges. Between May 2011 and July 232 
2011, the outbreak involved 3,842 cases (including 2,987 cases of gastrointestinal disease 233 
characterised by diarrhea), with 855 cases of hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) and 53 deaths 234 
(RKI, 2012) with at the peak of the outbreak more than 50 reported cases of HUS per day 235 
(McIntyre & Monaghan, 2016). The outbreak caused widespread concern and panic and a 236 
change to eating habits, as well as economic consequences impact particularly for farmers with 237 
the EU paying 220 million Euros for the loss of income (Burger, 2012).  238 
  Terrorism acts can be differentiated by those that seek to cause actual harm to 239 
individuals or populations and alternatively those acts that are symbolic to provoke anxiety and 240 
concern, and to change consumer behaviour leading to economic loss (Alvarez et al. 2010). 241 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) in their 2002 Report “Terrorist threats to food: 242 
guidance for establishing and strengthening prevention and response systems” states that an 243 
essential means to preventing food terrorism is the development, validation, implementation, 244 
monitoring and effective verification of food safety management programmes and their 245 
associated security measures, described here as countermeasures. To minimise risk, the report 246 
states that effective prevention requires food defence strategies to provide a concerted approach 247 
between government and industry.  Prevention is not the only approach within food defence 248 
strategies, surveillance is another element that should be employed. Agro-terrorism is the 249 
deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing 250 
economic losses, and/or undermining social stability (Monke, 2007). 251 
Agro-defence, the actions that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of an agro-terrorism 252 
incident specifically can be addressed through the use of emerging testing methods such as 253 
biosensors, colourmetric assays and digital apps that could prove to be an opportunity for early 254 
detection of agents such as viruses or pathogens (Neethirajan, Ragavan, & Weng, 2018). 255 
However, a recent conviction for planning of terrorism acts in the UK was determined through 256 
traditional policing/anti-terrorism methods. 257 
Case study 3: Kerry Foods, UK 258 
Temporary factory worker Munir Mohammed who was involved in ready meal manufacture at 259 
the Kerry Foods factory, and a pharmacist, Rowaida El Hasssan were arrested in December 260 
2016 and convicted in January 2018 of planning a terrorist attack using food as the vehicle 261 
(Stones, 2018). They were arrested after counter-terrorism surveillance identified that they had 262 
undertaken extensive on-line research on acetone peroxide or TATP and ricin both realistic 263 
agents for a terror attack on the food supply. The food company as well as the UK population 264 
were potential victims here. Kerry Foods were unaware that Munir Mohammed had been 265 
working illegally at the factory as he used EU documents in another man's name to gain work 266 
at the factory (Kreft & Crowson, 2018). This shows how important induction checks are for 267 
assuring that individuals working at food factories are who they claim to be. However these 268 
checks have limited preventive capacity if individuals intentionally lie about their identity. 269 
Other examples of recent food related terror threats include: in June 2016, Italian anarchists 270 
threatened to contaminate foodstuff in supermarkets in Lombardy with herbicide and in 271 
December 2016, Greek anarchists claimed they had contaminated several food and drink 272 
products of multinational companies (EUROPOL, 2017).  However intentional adulteration 273 
linked to the product is just one type of overt threat that needs to be addressed by food defense 274 
strategies. Clandestine or covert threats, where activities or the identity of perpetrators is 275 
purposefully hidden (Lord, 2015) are now considered. 276 
2.3 Covert Threats (Sabotage) 277 
In history, there have been multiple occasions when civilian food supplies have been 278 
sabotaged deliberately, during military campaigns or to deliver a specific social or 279 
political impact (Torok et al. 1997) with the associated trade and economic repercussions 280 
(WHO, 2002). Biological sabotage agents include zoonoses or animal disease (Manning, 281 
Baines & Chadd, 2005), but other agents could be used and their nature is primarily driven by 282 
their availability to the perpetrator. Previous sabotage actions against the food supply include 283 
to fruit trees and livestock in Palestine in 1933, or just more generally instances of working 284 
slowly, or instances of deliberate fire, damaging goods and intentionally breaking equipment. 285 
Thus, a saboteur is an individual who deliberately damages or destroys assets or infrastructure 286 
in order to weaken an enemy or make a protest (Collins Dictionary, nd). At the supply chain 287 
level, sabotage involves the “destruction of essential infrastructure affects people’s ability to 288 
access, process, distribute and utilise food.” (Koc, Jernigan, & Das, 2007:321) or a clandestine 289 
act to destroy, damage or render assets unusable (Douthit, 1987). The motivation for 290 
sabotage behaviour is a wish to ‘‘damage, disrupt, or subvert the organisation’s operations for 291 
the personal purposes of the saboteur by creating unfavourable publicity, embarrassment, 292 
delays in production, damage to property, the destruction of working relationships, or the 293 
harming of employees or customers’’ (Crino, 1994:312).  In this context, industrial sabotage 294 
can be seen as a form of counterproductive work behaviour (CWB) i.e. wilful behaviour by 295 
employees that could cause harm to fellow employees or the organisation itself (Spector & 296 
Fox, 2005; Krischer, Penney, & Hunter, 2010). Taylor and Walton (1971) cite a number of 297 
examples of industrial sabotage including one organisation having to throw away half a mile 298 
of “Blackpool rock” because an offensive expletive had been printed through the product. They 299 
argue that sabotage can be a singular or group activity, demonstrates underlying industrial 300 
conflict, and may link with other deviant and often irrational behaviour. Therefore the potential 301 
for an employee to undertake sabotage could be highlighted in advance by other negative 302 
behaviours such as absenteeism, low morale and job satisfaction, stress, and poor performance 303 
with job satisfaction being the mediating factor (Alias, Mohd Rasdi, Ismail, & Abu Samah, 304 
2013). This work suggests that early warning systems can be developed to identify those 305 
employees more likely to commit sabotage and to implement preventive strategies including 306 
improving staff morale to reduce the risk of occurrence. A sense of injustice or inequality can 307 
also be a leading motivational factor in workplace sabotage as can a sense of powerlessness or 308 
lack of autonomy. Frustration, often a secondary motivational factor, is triggered by previous 309 
incidents that then fuels anger, and a transition by workers from being rule compliance to 310 
bending the rules i.e. simple deviance from prescribed organisational norms to ultimately 311 
breaking the rules during work activities. This behaviour may have negative intent, be 312 
motivated more simply by a need to meet organisational goals that cannot otherwise be met by 313 
compliant behaviour, as a mechanism to reduce workplace boredom i.e. a means of 314 
entertainment or to deliver what the perpetrator believes is a form of retaliatory action or 315 
restorative justice (Ambrose, Seabright & Schminke, 2002).    Reducing the risk of actions seen 316 
by employees as restorative justice lies at the heart of how sabotage can be prevented by food 317 
defence strategies. This includes the development of positive organisational culture to reduce 318 
the potential for power dynamics, reducing management decisions that can be perceived as 319 
driving inequality within the workplace or supply chain and not promoting goals (financial, 320 
operational etc.) that can only be achieved by deviant behaviour. 321 
 There is limited evidence in the literature of sabotage in the food supply chain so a more 322 
detailed example case study is not provided here. 323 
2.4 Covert Threats (Industrial Espionage) 324 
 Private or confidential information means “any kind of information which the 325 
organisation feels should not be freely available to outsiders and which therefore should be 326 
subject to some kind of moral or legal protection.” (Crane, 2005:237). Consideration of 327 
espionage in the food science literature is novel and thus requires the development of the 328 
terminology used in other sectors that can then be applied to food defense threats. Crane (2005) 329 
states that the test of whether an activity can be determined as espionage is to consider: the 330 
nature of the information that is under threat, the tactics employed, and the purpose for which 331 
the information will be used. There are multiple tactics that Crane suggests could be defined 332 
as questionable (Table 2) including breaking and entering into a competitor’s premises to steal 333 
information through to posing as fictitious supplies, potential employees or customers. In order 334 
for such threats to be actioned it may involve stealing the information, infiltration using insiders 335 
to report, electronic eavesdropping or covert recording to gain information or material, or 336 
remote attacks through digital systems (PAS 95, 2017), or to weaken the capabilities, reputation 337 
and brand value of a competing business (van Arnam, 2001). 338 
Take in Table 2 339 
Estimates of the cost of such activity to US industry run between $45 billion and $100 340 
billion per annum; an average of $50 million per incident and a loss of employment estimated 341 
at six million jobs (van Arnam, 2001). Industrial espionage can also be described as corporate 342 
spying, corporate espionage, or economic espionage. Essentially, industrial espionage is the 343 
use of espionage or spying techniques often focused on commercial rivals for commercial 344 
purposes e.g. seeking to access trade secrets, intellectual property (IP) such as patents, 345 
copyrights, trademarks, recipes, product formulations, theories, software, processing 346 
techniques, designs or data that could impact brand value for commercial advantage (Crane, 347 
2005; Bogadi, Banović, & Babić, 2016).  e.g. production details, strategic or marketing 348 
information (Budiono, & Sawitri, 2017).   349 
Historical examples of industrial espionage include: two employees of DuPont 350 
Industrial Biosciences stealing information about the manufacturing process for titanium 351 
dioxide, an ingredient used in the food industry and then selling the information on to a Chinese 352 
chemical company (O’Halloran, 2014; Bogadi, Banović, & Babić, 2016); stealing the 353 
blueprints of the British Cartwright power loom (Fan, Jun, & Wolfstetter, 2016), an attempt to 354 
steal the blueprints for the Intel Pentium processor by an employee (van Arnam, 2001); 355 
smuggling of silkworms from China 1500 years ago and stealing of IP around porcelain (van 356 
Arnam, 2001); and theft of IP surrounding tea production in China (Budiono, & Sawitri, 2017; 357 
Fan, Jun, & Wolfstetter, 2017). 358 
 Case study 4: East India Company - Tea 359 
In 1848, the British wanted to be able to grow tea in India and break into a trade 360 
monopolised at the time by China (Budiono, & Sawitri, 2017). Therefore the East India Co. 361 
employed a botanist, Robert Fortune, to visit China and to smuggle materials and obtain the 362 
information on growing tea plants and the making/processing of tea (Fortune, 1852; Budiono, 363 
& Sawitri, 2017). Sigley (2015) explores this case in more detail: 364 
“[Fortune] was given the task of travelling to China, and in particular to the tea growing 365 
regions of Fujian and Anhui, to collect tea seeds and live tea seedlings and transport them 366 
back to India. He was also directed to obtain as much knowledge about the tea production 367 
process as possible. Robert Fortune’s mission was very successful. He collected a large horde 368 
of tea plants and seeds and also convinced a number of tea farmers from Anhui to go with 369 
him to India to assist in the growing and production of the tea.” (Sigley, 2015:332) 370 
The case of espionage described here involved the stealing of physical material and 371 
information, however modern food defence strategies also need to include strategies to prevent 372 
covert digital threats such as cyber-crime and hacktivism. 373 
2.5 Covert threats (Cyber-attacks) 374 
Identity is the characteristics that determine who or what a person, product or 375 
organisation is and this identity can exist in both the physical and in the digital arena. Thus 376 
identity theft is the use of an individual’s or organisation’s identity by another individual or 377 
organisation for financial gain, espionage, revenge, or terrorism (Vidalis & Angelopoulou, 378 
2014). Thus digital identity theft can be considered as an element of wider identity fraud. 379 
Information security is very important. Indeed (Budiono, & Sawitri, 2017:31) state that threats 380 
focused on information theft “can infiltrate all levels of the organisation; product development, 381 
production, innovation, information security, personnel policies, finance, mergers & 382 
acquisitions, strategy, foreign relations, cultural diversity, ethics, technology and information 383 
policy.” Hackers, via security weaknesses, deface or disable web sites, attack networks, or 384 
disrupt programmes by adding code that is then used to gain access to more sensitive data (van 385 
Arnam, 2001). The most common reasons for an individual(s) to hack a given companies is to 386 
attempt to reduce the business efficiency of food companies as well as to enable data theft 387 
(Bogadi, Banović, & Babić, 2016). Hacktivists undertake cyber-attacks that are ideologically 388 
or politically motivated e.g. data exposure to highlight potential unethical practices by 389 
institutions. Examples include in the Stuxnet worm in July 2010 aimed at Siemens systems and 390 
specifically the Iran nuclear programme (Detica, 2011); 2014 the hacktivist group Anonymous 391 
caused major disruption in hospital operations at Boston’s Children’s Hospital (Mohammed, 392 
2017); data exposure for South African banks (Van Niekerk, 2017); defacement of 393 
organisational websites (Van Niekerk, 2017); and a malware attack on Merck (Mohammed, 394 
2017).  395 
The nature of cyber threats is evolving rapidly and there is constant evolution in 396 
technology and the ability to infiltrate digital networks (Khursheed, Kumar, & Sharma, 2016). 397 
Bendovschi (2015) divides cyber-attacks into four categories, based on the objective of the 398 
attack namely: cyber-crime, cyber espionage, cyber war (not considered here) and hacktivism. 399 
Cyber-crime is the unauthorised access to electronic communication and databases, networks, 400 
programmes and data in order to “compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 401 
information” that belongs to given organisations or supply chains (Bendovschi, 2015:25). 402 
Cyber espionage is essentially the ability to obtain data without the permission of the data 403 
owner (Dawson, 2018). Particular mechanisms and techniques that fall within the scope of such 404 
cyber attacks include phishing, malware, and distributed denial of service (DDos) see Table 3. 405 
Take in Table 3 406 
In 2012, two Romanian men admitted participating in an international conspiracy that hacked 407 
into Subway credit-card payment terminals at more than 150 Subway restaurant franchises and 408 
stole data from more than 146,000 compromised cards with more than $10 million in losses 409 
(Gross, 2012; Khursheed, Kumar, & Sharma, 2016). The work of Bendovschi (2015) highlights 410 
that while the public sector such as government, or law enforcement is most likely to be the 411 
victim of cyber espionage, cyber war and hacktivism techniques, cyber-crime is a problem for 412 
all business sectors. The UK Cyber Security Breaches Survey (2018) highlights that 43% of 413 
businesses surveyed in 2017 (n=1519) identified they had been victim to a cyber attack in the 414 
previous twelve months rising to 72% in large businesses (250 employees or more) and only 415 
27% of the businesses had a formal cyber security policy, 13% had a formal cyber security 416 
incident management process and 9% held specific cyber security insurance. Further in the 417 
survey only 20% of businesses had staff who had attended a cybersecurity training session in 418 
the last twelve months barriers to take-up being cost, format and access and not seeing the need 419 
for training. The multiple types of cyber-attack highlighted in Table 3 e.g. brute force attack, 420 
distributed denial of service, financial attack, data corruption or data exposure, man in the 421 
middle attacks, phising, malware, scareware and system penetration are all viable food defense 422 
risks that sit outside the definition of intentional product adulteration. The biggest vulnerability 423 
to cyber-attacks was where staff used personal devices for work or cloud computing. McGuire 424 
(2012) proposed a typology of six types of cybercrime groups with three subgroups each with 425 
two subtypes (Table 4). 426 
Take in Table 4 427 
The three types are firstly online offending via a swarm typical of hacktivist groups, hubs that 428 
drive phishing attacks or use of scareware, type 2 hybrids with both online and offline 429 
offending either as clusters or extended networks and thirdly mainly offline groups. This final 430 
type can be based on hierarchical groups or temporary assemblages of aggregate groups that 431 
can align and then realign. The existence of these cyber criminal groups means that food supply 432 
chain organisations need to be on their guard and have effective food defense strategies to 433 
mitigate risk. Further empirical research needs to be undertaken to determine whether this is 434 
actually the case.  435 
Cybersecurity can be described as the countermeasures taken to protect a computer system 436 
and associated storage clouds or individual appliance against an intentional malicious target 437 
attack and/or unauthorised access and unintentional or accidental access (Soon, Manning & 438 
Smith, 2019). ISO 27001:2013 Information Security Management Systems is the international 439 
standard that sets out a series of requirements for establishing, implementing, monitoring and 440 
improving an Information Security Management System (ISMS). Security management is the 441 
“systematic and coordinated activities and practices through which an organiaation optimally 442 
manages its risks, and the associated potential threats and impacts there from” (ISO 443 
28000:2007). Security management is critical with regard to digital security and also with 444 
physical security in the supply chain as addressed by ISO 28000 especially with regard to 445 
threats such as theft, or terrorism. Specific and generic food defence strategies are now 446 
discussed. 447 
3. Food defence strategies: supply chain and organisational levels 448 
To be successful, perpetrators of the activities described in this paper rely on a lack of 449 
preparedness by the victim (Olson, 2012: Wiśniewska, 2015). Therefore, in order to be 450 
effective, food defence strategies needs to consider the perpetrator, the relevance of the impact 451 
of potential attacks in terms of risk to the consumer, and also how that frames the perpetrators 452 
motivation to cause harm (Manning and Soon, 2016).  453 
3.1 Food defense strategies   454 
 Food defence risk assessment, especially with regard to microbial agents, should consider the 455 
availability of potential agents, the potential perpetrator, the means of weaponisation and the 456 
deliver of the agent, and the likelihood of detection between dissemination and infection as 457 
well as product associated risks such as geopolitical factors, specific consumer populations at 458 
risk, psychological impact e.g. threats centred on foods used for religious ceremonies and the 459 
challenge of mixing or diluting the agent in a given product (Elad, 2005). The FDA require 460 
food defence vulnerability assessments (FDA, 2018b) such as CARVER+Shock, whilst GFSI 461 
(2017) refers to food defence threat assessment such as TACCP.  Risk assessment methods 462 
currently used by the industry include TACCP (see Manning and Soon (2016) for a wider 463 
discussion) and a combined food safety (hazard analysis critical control point or HACCP). 464 
Another approach is to develop a food defence plan using a hazard analysis critical control and 465 
defense points (HACCP-DP) plan, where HACCPDP is an extension of a food safety plan and 466 
TACCP is a stand-alone threat and vulnerability risk assessment process and associated plan 467 
(Wiśniewska, (2015). Essentially the process for developing a HACCP-DP plan as outlined by 468 
Yoe and Schwartz (2010) is to build on the established seven principles and twelve steps of 469 
HACCP with three further steps to build the food defence element: 470 
 Step 1 – determine critical defence points (CDPs) in your process 471 
 Step 2 – define food defence mitigation (more recently termed countermeasures) 472 
 Step 3 – implement test, assess and maintain defence mitigation activities 473 
This holistic approach is limited within the scope of food defence used in this paper as it would 474 
mainly address examples of intentional adulteration rather than food defence threats such as 475 
espionage, cyber-crime and hacktivism that are not necessarily related to food product 476 
adulteration. The HACCP-DP approach and requires those applying the tool to have 477 
appropriate training on food safety, food fraud (if that falls within the scope of the HACCP-478 
DP) and food defence. The application of TACCP aims to reduce the likelihood and 479 
consequences of a food fraud or a food defence threat being realised. The scope of TACCP 480 
includes both EMA, wider aspects of food fraud such as counterfeiting and also intentional 481 
adulteration, food terrorism, and extortion, as well as covert activities such as sabotage, 482 
espionage and cybercrime. HACCP-DP, and TACCP both use a semi-quantitative risk 483 
assessment as does CARVER-SHOCK approaches and vulnerability analysis critical control 484 
point (VACCP) and wider vulnerability assessment tools. This creates a challenge in that only 485 
known and assessable threats can be prioritised in this way. Indeed the greatest flaw in these 486 
approaches is the recognised hazard (threat), control measure (countermeasure) and then a 487 
subjective scoring system to identify CCPs or CDPs. The weaknesses embedded in assessing 488 
non-microbial food safety hazards via a HACCP, translates to TACCP in terms of what is 489 
deemed an acceptable risk has both scientific, legal and moral aspects and thus is a relative 490 
construct and not just a binary decision. However as Wiśniewska (2015) outlines the advantage 491 
of using HACCP-based approaches to build food defence strategies is that they are familiar to 492 
the food industry and thus are more easily adopted and integrated into existing systems and 493 
practices. A concern that can be raised though, is that whilst a food safety HACCP plan is in 494 
continuous use and this maintains familiarity with controls and preventive and corrective 495 
actions, food defence issues occur much less frequently and this means that knowledge and 496 
understanding of food defence strategies and how they are employed may be lost unless regular 497 
refresher training is undertaken Further, given the very relative low probability of a deliberate 498 
food defense event, some organisations may feel that the costs of implementing food defense 499 
plans is disproportionate to the actual risk (Davidson et al. 2017). The risk assessment tools 500 
(HACCP, TACCP< VACCP. HACCP-DP) considered here have limited value in terms of 501 
unknown or unquantifiable threats creating then potential for vulnerabilities to be unrecognised 502 
and this leads to the possibility that decision-makers may identify a subsequent incident as 503 
being unforeseeable.  504 
3.2 Guardians and hurdles 505 
Appealing to criminology literature gives rise to specific terminology which those developing 506 
food defence strategies meet to be conversant with. The crime triangle as explored by Spink et 507 
al. (2016) includes consideration of the perpetrator, the victim and how opportunity for the 508 
activity to take place is mediated by guardians and hurdles. The food defence team members 509 
and the plan implementers roles are  to be “guardians” i.e. the individuals operating at supply 510 
chain or individual business or production line levels (Spink et al. 2015) that have the 511 
knowledge, skills and understanding to develop and implement food defence strategies. The 512 
visibility of food defence guardians acts as a deterrent (Reynald, 2009; Hollis & Willson, 2014; 513 
Manning, Soon & Smith, 2019) and thus is essential to delivering effective food defence 514 
strategies. However those designated as guardians need to understand their role and what is 515 
expected of them so effective training is essential with refresher activities in the event that new 516 
threats emerge. Hurdles are the formal system components that reduce opportunity for food 517 
crime by either assisting detection or by acting as a deterrent (Spink et al. 2015; Manning, Soon 518 
& Smith, 2019).  Hurdles can be physical hurdles in terms of protecting structural assets 519 
(barriers, enclosed production systems), or artefact-based hurdles such as procedures and 520 
protocols or cyber-protection via firewalls and virus software. Thus the HACCP-DP plan will 521 
signpost to relevant hurdles and guardians as well as defining countermeasures that are adopted 522 
within food defense strategies to mitigate risk.  523 
3.3 Countermeasures 524 
 Countermeasures are measures, often preventive in nature, are intended to 525 
reduce criminal opportunity in food supply chains (Spink et al. 2015). Physical and technical 526 
countermeasures such as physical hurdles are referred to as hard controls whereas managerial 527 
controls (artefact based hurdles) are termed soft controls (van Ruth, Huisman & Luning, 2017). 528 
Passive countermeasures are in operation at all times e.g. supplier assessment protocols 529 
whereas reactive countermeasures are implemented should an incident occur in order to lessen 530 
the impact once the threat is realised (Mitenus, Kennedy & Busta, 2014), for example product 531 
recall strategies or product testing programmes as in the case of the 1080 incident in NZ. 532 
Countermeasures for food defence are often the same global or specific protocols and policies 533 
that have been developed as part of existing pre-requisite programmes such as good 534 
manufacturing practice (GMP) or good hygienic practice (GHP).   535 
 With regard to cyber attacks specifically, organisations need to have a clear 536 
defence strategy and will often need outside expertise to assist them to reduce vulnerability. 537 
Bendovschi (2015) determines three kinds of countermeasure within a cybersecurity strategy: 538 
preventive security controls that aim to prevent the realisation of a threat i.e. to restrict and 539 
prevent unauthorised access to an organisation’s network, programmes or data; detective 540 
security controls that seek to detect information security threats e.g. intrusion detection systems 541 
that monitors network traffic and potentially suspicious activity; corrective security controls 542 
that are implemented if non-conformity is identified and implement business recovery 543 
procedures after a cyber attack. 544 
4. Concluding thoughts 545 
Food defence is an under-researched phenomenon and there is limited information in the public 546 
domain on the topic area. At the same time as an inherent knowledge gap in industry on what 547 
food defence strategies need to address, there is an increasing requirement for organisations in 548 
the food supply chain to develop and adopt food defence strategies to assure market entry 549 
through third-party certification of their management systems. Certification standards include 550 
those benchmarked to the GFSI standards. In order countries such as the US there is a 551 
regulatory requirement to develop food defense strategies too. To develop food industry 552 
guidance and to inform food defence risk assessment and management processes, a taxonomy 553 
needs to be developed and accepted across the food industry so that threats can be consistently 554 
identified and effectively addressed and as a result consumers, industry partners, shareholders 555 
and also the organisation itself can be protected. The taxonomy developed in this research 556 
frames both physical and digital threats, and overt and covert threats and introduces the term 557 
impact orientated adulteration to clearly distinguish these types of product- related threats from 558 
wider EMA issues. The work gives particular insight into the types of cyber crimes and cyber 559 
criminals that are of concern in the food supply chain and this will support more effective risk 560 
assessment of these particular types of threats. 561 
  562 
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Table 1 Examples of Intentional Food Supply Chain Contamination 1950-2008 (Adapted 898 
from Dalziel, 2009) 899 
 900 
Stage of supply 
chain 
Total  
confirmed 
cases  
Agents used Fatalities Injuries Notes 
Water Supply 7 Pesticide, 
Insecticide, 
Cyanide, Sheep dip, 
VX, Sarin 
3 <100 Multiple additional 
unconfirmed incidents 
Pre-harvest 365 Glyphosate, plant 
toxin, cyanide, 
cattle feed as a 
vehicle, rodenticide 
0 0 Impact limited to the animals 
concerned or the crops 
prevented from entering the 
food supply chain. Key 
countermeasure is 
investigation post livestock 
death or identification of crop 
contamination and removal 
from the market. 
Post harvest, and 
manufacturing 
3 Mercury, glass, 
needles, rat poison 
0 125 Numerous unconfirmed 
incidents  
Retail and food 
service 
89 Acetone, Arsenic, 
Atropine, Cyanide, 
Herbicide, 
Insecticie, Pesticide, 
Physical 
contaminants incl. 
rodenticide, 
Rohypnol, 
Salmonella 
Typhimurium, 
Thallium 
123 3394 These cases include alleged 
assassination attempts. The 
1984 Rajneeshee cult incident 
affected 751 people. An 
incident in 1992 in 
Zhengzhou, China affected 
788 people who fell ill from 
arsenic poisoning in flour in 
the school cafeteria. In 2005, 
28 people died and 130 were 
injured from organophosphate 
pesticide in cassava fritters 
sold to school children 
Consumer/Home 265 Multiple 265 670 Many cases were intentional 
homicide focused on specific 
individuals (victims) often 
family members. 
  901 
Table 2. Examples of questionable espionage tactics (Adapted from Crane, 2005) 902 
 903 
Questionable tactics 
 Breaking and entering into a competitor’s premises to steal information or installing recording 
devices.  
Contacting competitors with fake identity such as a potential customer or supplier 
Covert surveillance through spy cameras. 
Hiring private detectives to track competitor’s staff. 
Infiltrating competitor organisations with industrial spies. 
Interviewing competitors’ employees for a bogus job vacancy.  
Pressuring the customers or suppliers of competitors to reveal sensitive information about their 
operations. 
Searching through a competitor’s rubbish. 
 
 904 
Table 3. Types of cyber attack (Adapted from Detica, 2011; McGuire and Dowling, 2013; Bendovschi, 2015; Khursheed, Kuma & 905 
Sharma, 2016; Van Niekerk, 2017) 906 
 907 
Type of attack Security risk 
Brute force attack describes repeated attempts to gain access to protected information 
(e.g. passwords, encryption, etc.) until the correct key is found, and security is 
breached. Social engineering is the general term that describes techniques used to gain 
unauthorised access to information through human interaction 
This type of attack allows unauthorised access to sensitive information. 
Data corruption to cause disruption to services and activities Data could be corrupted or lost. 
Data exposure often in an attempt to show unethical behaviour or conduct This type of attack has seen information being published by Wikileaks and others 
Defacement of websites often with political or ideological slogans Websites can be defaced with political and ideological slogans or legitimate links 
might be redirected to pornographic websites e.g. the 1996 attack on the US 
Department of Justice homepage. 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a type of attack that compromises the 
availability of data, in the way that the attacker floods the victim (e.g. server) with 
commands, thus becoming inoperable. Extortion attempts may them be made by the 
attacker to clean up the computer or recover full services 
DDos attacks on Estonia (2007) and Myanmar (2010) caused significant 
disruption with Myanmar cut off from the Internet for more than 10 days. 
Financial attack to steal money from accounts or fraudulent emails or links to fake tax 
revenue forms 
In 2012, Subway’s credit-card payment terminals were attacked with more than 
146,000 compromised cards and more than $10 million in losses 
Malware is a generic term describing types of malicious software. Examples of 
malware are: viruses, worms, trojans, spyware, ransomware, adware and 
scareware/rogware. 
Malware is used by the attacker to compromise the confidentiality, availability 
and integrity of data. Spyware is software that invades users’ privacy by gathering 
sensitive or personal information from infected systems and monitoring the 
websites visited [that] may then be transmitted to third parties (McGuire and 
Dowling, 2013:5) 
Man in the middle (MitM) attack occurs when the attacker interferes between two 
organisations i.e. every message sent from source A to source B and vice versa reaches 
the attacker before reaching its destination. 
This type of attack allows not only access to unauthorised access to sensitive 
information, but also the opportunity to alter the information/ message between 
sending and receipt.  
Phishing is a technique that aims to steal confidential information from users by 
masquerading as a trusted source (e.g. website) 
An example would be the sending of bogus money transfer requests or emails 
targeted at individuals – “spoofing” i.e. misleading individuals into entering 
details into a counterfeit website; “pharming” redirecting website traffic from a 
legitimate to a fraudulent website. Botnets are clusters of computers that send out 
spam, phishing emails automatically after being infected by malicious software. 
Scareware is a technique where the attacker misleads individuals into downloading 
software onto their computer by using fear tactics or unethical marketing practices e.g. 
by frightening individuals that their computer is at risk 
. The software may be ineffective or partially effective before infecting the 
computer with its own viruses. The attackers may request payment to clean up the 
computer. 
System penetration to steal information or other espionage activities The US supermarket Target was attacked over the Thanksgiving season where 40 
million credit and debit card data was stolen 
Table 4: Typology of cyber criminals (Adapted from McGuire, 2012; Broadhurst, Grabosky, Alazab, Bouhours, & Chon, 2014). 908 
 909 
Sub-group Sub-type Description 
Type 1 – online 
offending 
Swarms Large disorganised networks that are active online and are typically made up of clusters of ideologically 
driven individuals. Lack clear command structure. Swarms are characteristic of hacktivist groups.  
Hubs Large collective organisations/networks with clear focal point (hub) and command structure. Strong ties 
and continued interaction between individual members. Activities include development of botnets, 
phishing attacks, use of scareware 
Type 2 – Hybrids 
with online and 
offline offending 
Clustered 
hybrid 
Small group of individuals that are focused on specific activities and interactions as with a hub but their 
activity is both online and offline offending e.g. skimming cards in the physical world to then use the data 
online. 
Extended 
hybrid 
Not as centralised as a clustered hybrid. More subgroups and associates but still with a level of 
coordination 
Type 3 –   
Mainly offline but 
undertake some 
activity online 
Hierarchies Traditional criminal groups who transpose some activities online e.g. increasing scope of extortion 
activities. 
Aggregate 
groups 
Loosely organised, temporary groups with opaque purpose that use digital technology in a disorganised 
way to support other activities 
 910 
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